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[Facts]
One of the accused was a former employee of the now-defunct Social Insurance Agency 
the predecessor of the Japan Pension Service (Horikoshi case). The other was a former 
Assistant Division Chief at the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (Setagaya case). They 
handed out the Japanese Communist Party’s (JCP) organ newspaper, with the intention of 
supporting the JCP, on their day off, far from their workplaces, and without identifying 
themselves as public servants. They were indicted on charges that these activities were in 
violation of Article 102 paragraph 11） and Article 110 paragraph 1 (xix)2） before it was 
amended in 2009 of the National Public Service Law (hereinafter referred to as the NPSL) 
and Rule 14-7 paragraph 6 (7)3） of the Rules of the National Personnel Authority (hereinafter 
referred to as the RNPA) (hereinafter together referred to as “the Rules”). The only 
differences between the two cases were the accuseds’ respective positions and level of 
authority in their work places. The accused in the Horikoshi case had no discretionary power 
in his role nor any administrative authority as he did not hold a managerial post, while the 
accused in the Setagaya case held a position where he directly supervised many other 
government officials.
In the judgment of the first instance, fines of 100,000 yen (ca. $100) were imposed on 
both of the accused, suspended for two years. However, in the second instance of the 
Horikoshi case, the Tokyo High Court said that application of the Rules to the accused’s 
  1）　The provision reads as follows: “Officials shall not solicit, or receive, or be in any manner concerned 
in soliciting or receiving any subscription or other benefit for any political party or political purpose, or 
engage in any political acts as provided for by rules of the National Personnel Authority other than to 
exercise his/her right to vote.”
  2）　The provision reads as follows: “Any person who falls under any of the following items shall be 
punished by imprisonment with labor for not more than three years or a fine of not more than one 
hundred thousand yen: …(xix) Any person who has violated the restrictions on political acts provided 
for in paragraph 1 of Article 102;…”
  3）　The provision reads as follows: “Political acts provided for in Article 102 paragraph 1 of the Law 
includes the following actions: … (vii) issuing, editing, and handing out organ papers or other 
publication of parties or groups or supporting these activities” 
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activity meant that the Rules’ restriction on freedom of political activities by a civil servant 
went beyond what was necessary and was therefore too extensive. The Rules were contrary 
to a number of Articles of the Constitution of Japan (the Constitution), including Article 19, 
which guarantees freedom of thought, Article 21 paragraph 1, which guarantees freedom of 
expression, and Article 31, which envisages the principle of nulla poena sine lege (no 
punishment without law). Therefore, it found the accused not guilty. Nevertheless, in the 
second trial of the Setagaya case, the court found that the Rules were consistent with the 
Constitution and denied the appeal. Both cases were appealed in the Supreme Court, by the 
Prosecutor in the Horikoshi case, and by the Defendant in the Setagaya case.
[Judgments]
1. Constitutionality of the Rules
The aims of the Rules are to establish political neutrality and the trust of Japanese 
citizens in the civil service by maintaining the political neutrality of officials in performing 
their function. The “political activities” prohibited in paragraph 6 (vii) and (xiii) of the RNPA 
include only the activities which substantially impair the neutrality of civil servants. Whether 
or not the activities would essentially impair the neutrality should be decided comprehensively 
based on the post the public official held as well as on the details of the activities in which 
he/she engaged. The Rules applied in the present cases are necessary and reasonable under 
the Constitution. Moreover, what Article 102 paragraph 1 of the NPSL entrusts to the RNPA 
is merely to specifically define the types of political activities mentioned above as objects for 
restriction. Hence, this entrustment is not prohibited in the Constitution. Furthermore, the 
existence of criminal punishment on the prohibited activities is not itself unconstitutional. 
This is because there may be a situation where an administrative disposition such as 
disciplinary dismissal is not sufficient compared to the significance of the activity. In such 
situation, imposing a criminal punishment would be appropriate. The accused’s activity has 
greater seriousness than an activity for which administrative measures would be imposed. For 
these reasons, the Rules are not inconsistent with the Articles of the Constitution, including 
Article 19, 21 paragraph 1, and 31.
     
2. Coincidence with the definition of a crime
(a) The Horikoshi case (not guilty)
The activity of the accused was carried out by a civil servant who held no managerial 
position and had no discretionary power. And he did not identify himself as a government 
worker. Therefore, there is no substantial possibility of harming the political neutrality of a 
government official.
     
(b) The Setagaya case (guilty)
The activity of the accused may have revealed the personal politics of a government 
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official who held a managerial position. Hence, the probability that these personal politics 
would emerge as part of his function is higher and this could affect the function of civil 
servants who work under his direction and the administration of the organization. Therefore, 
even taking into consideration certain circumstances, including the fact that the activity was 
carried out on his day off, the activity falls under the definition of a crime, since it was an 
act which substantially impaired the neutrality of a civil servant, and a criminal punishment 
should be imposed.
     
[Commentary]
In the Sarufutsu case, 4） the precedent jurisprudence on the freedom of political activities 
of civil servants, the specific circumstances, including the position of a civil servant, and 
whether the actions occurred either inside or outside of working hours, were not considered. 
In the present cases, however, it seems that the definition of a civil servant and prohibited 
activities were interpreted restrictively by using the concept of “comprehensive consideration,” 
which means to consider the above-mentioned circumstances in deciding whether the 
activities may have substantially impaired the neutrality of the civil servant. Nevertheless, 
some problems relating to this issue have still been left unsolved.
In the present cases, the Supreme Court maintained the view that the rights provided for 
in the Constitution and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the 
Covenant) were identical, and held without specific consideration that there was no violation 
of the Covenant as the Rules were not inconsistent with the Constitution. The Japanese 
government and all organizations of the State are obliged to observe in good faith 
international instruments under Article 98 of the Constitution. In the judgment of the second 
instance of the Setagata case, it seems that the court has stated that it is not the UN Human 
Rights Committee but only Japanese courts that have the power to interpret the Covenant. 
However, this is clearly erroneous. The authority to interpret the provisions of international 
treaties is given not only to Japan.5） Moreover, the existence of the Human Rights Committee 
must not be ignored. It is a treaty body of the Covenant which shows guidelines to interpret 
the provisions in their activities; for example, general comments on the provisions of the 
Covenant and views in individual complaint procedure. The International Court of Justice 
held that while it has no binding power, weight should be given to the committee’s 
interpretation of the Covenant in these documents.6） Japanese courts should interpret and 
apply in good faith the provisions of the Covenant since the Constitution and the Covenant 
are different, although they provide for similar rights. The Supreme Court judgments in the 
  4）　Keishū, Vol. 28 No.9, at 393.
  5）　Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides for the way to interpret 
provisions of international treaties.
  6）　International Court of Justice, Advisory Opinion, Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall 
in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, I.C.J. Reports 2004, at 136.
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present cases are reviewed below in light of the provisions of the Covenant outlined in the 
next paragraph. 
Article 19 of the Covenant enshrines the right to freedom of expression, but paragraph 3 
of this Article allows the States to limit this right under three conditions; that these 
restrictions shall be provided for by law, that they shall have legitimate aims, and finally that 
they shall be consistent with the principle of proportionality. The Committee has shown its 
concern about restrictions on political activities by public employees7） and has pointed out 
that paragraph 3 should be interpreted restrictively.8）
Restrictions on freedom of expression shall be prescribed by law. Moreover, the 
provisions of such law must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to 
regulate his or her conduct accordingly. In its view, the Committee admitted that ambiguity 
of a law which restricts freedom of expression might be made clear by administrative rules 
or case law.9） Therefore, restriction of this right would not necessarily be found to be a 
violation of the Covenant because it was established by an administrative rule. However, in 
regards to the Rules, the provisions can be read as a restriction imposed on all civil servants 
generally. Furthermore, the criteria for the concept of “comprehensive consideration” are 
ambiguous. Hence, it seems that the Rules and present judgments are not as precise as 
Article 19 paragraph 3 of the Covenant requires.
In the second instance of the Setagaya case, the court found that one of the aims of the 
Rules was the maintenance of public order, which corresponds to one of legitimate aims for 
restricting freedom of expression enumerated in paragraph 3. However, under the 
jurisprudence of individual complaint procedure, the Committee has requested States which 
have alleged existence of a threat to “public order” to concretely prove the nature and the 
extent of the threat.10） Nevertheless, since under the Rules and the courts’ jurisprudence it has 
not been explained how and to what extent the political activities provided for in the Rules 
could threaten the neutrality of a civil servant, this “threat” remains more abstract than that 
the committee requires. 
Moreover, even when the aim is legitimate, in the case where a measure to pursue this 
aim has no proportionality, the measure, namely the restriction of freedom of expression, will 
be an unreasonable infringement of this right. In this regard, the Vogt case must be referred 
to.11） It was examined by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), which is a treaty 
  7）　Concluding observation, Human Rights Committee, Japan, 30 October 2008.
  8）　General Comment No. 34, Human Rights Committee, 21 September 2011.
  9）　Faurisson v. France, Communication No. 550/1993.
 10）　See, e.g., Sohn v. Republic of Korea, Communication No. 518/1992.
 11）　European Court of Human Rights, Judgment, Vogt v. Germany, 26 September 1995. The Applicant 
had worked as a German and French teacher at a secondary school and had engaged in various political 
activities on behalf of the German Communist Party (Deutsche Kommunistische Partei “DKP”). Because 
of this, she was dismissed from her work of the “charge” that she had failed to comply with her duty 
of political loyalty to the Basic Law described in certain codes and laws. She had alleged her right to 
freedom of expression had been infringed upon by this disciplinary sanction.
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body of the European Convention of Human Rights (the Convention). While the Convention 
is a mere regional treaty and Japan is not a contracting party, the Convention and the 
Covenant were both established based on the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
have influenced each other.
In the Vogt case, while ECtHR observed that the aim of the restriction was legitimate, 
taking the special context of Germany into consideration, it also stated that the word 
“necessary” in Article 10 paragraph 2 of the Convention12） implied the existence of a 
“pressing social need”. It continued that since the applicant engaged in the activities outside 
of her workplace, there was no social need to dismiss her from her post, consequently her 
dismissal was disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.
In the Setagaya case, there was no evidence that the accused had engaged in the 
political activity inside of his workplace. Additionally, unlike Mrs. Vogt, who was a candidate 
in the elections for the Parliament of the Land, he did not identified himself as a civil servant 
when he engaged in the alleged activity. According to these facts, it is doubtful whether his 
alleged activities would have damaged the political neutrality of his function under the Rules, 
and it seems that there was no “pressing social need” to penalize him. Therefore, it is 
difficult to say that the criminal punishment imposed on him fulfilled the principle of 
proportionality. Further, it seems that a restriction on a civil servant’s activities outside of 
work means completely banning him/her from supporting a specific political party.
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court judgments in this case did not justify the Rules 
in light of international human rights law. The Rules would have been found to be contrary 
to the Covenant if the Court had interpreted and applied international instruments in good 
faith.
(NAKAMURA Nana)
 12）　The provision reads as follows: “The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed 
by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity 
or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in 
confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."

